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ABSTRACT 
 
Rachel Ramsay: Explaining Restraint from Filibustering in the U.S. Senate: 
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis Approach 
(Under the direction of Andrew Perrin) 
 
While Senate observers describe the modern filibuster as costless, senators still 
sometimes choose to forgo filibustering even when that results in the passage of legislation 
that they oppose.  This study seeks to identify the circumstances under which legislation that 
is opposed by a cloture-blocking minority is not filibustered.  Fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA) is used to uncover the combinations of causal conditions that 
result in restraint from filibuster.  Analysis of data from 1975 through 2006 reveals that 
restraint is most likely when time is not constrained, there was low filibustering during the 
previous Congress, the president shares membership in the Senate’s majority party, and 
Democrats are not in the minority.  Despite being included in the analysis, party polarization 
is not part of this pathway. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Symbolic boundaries are an inescapable aspect of social life (Durkheim and Mauss 
1963, Zerubavel 1991).  Such boundaries are neither neutral nor static; the power to impose 
symbolic distinctions is key for both incumbents’ upholding and challengers’ disputing social 
positions (Bourdieu 1984, Lamont 1992, Lamont and Molnár 2002).  Complicating this 
struggle is the danger that symbolic acts are subject to diminishing returns, and this applies to 
the political field no less than any other (Klapp 1991, Best 2008).  Symbolic inflation 
contributes to recent dysfunction in U.S. government: it is a key driver in the increasing use 
of the filibuster as routine opposition becomes ever more extreme. 
Unlike the House of Representatives, the Senate has a long tradition of unlimited 
debate.  In 1806, the Senate discontinued its little-used “previous question” rule and thereby 
opened the door to senators’ holding the floor for the purpose of obstructing legislation.  It 
was not until 1917 that pressure from the public and president alike forced the Senate to 
again adopt a means of closing debate.  The parliamentary innovation of invoking cloture, 
thereby placing a time limit on further debate, introduced new problems, and most research 
on the filibuster focuses on its role in legislative gridlock (Krehbiel 1998; Binder 1999, 2003; 
Chiou and Rothenberg 2003, 2006, 2009).  Because invoking cloture requires a 
supermajority, filibustering has prevented the passage of legislation that otherwise has 
majority support (Binder and Smith 1997).  This inability to pass majority-backed legislation 
has contributed to the public perception of the Senate as a broken chamber (Packer 2010). 
2 
 
The number of filibusters per Congress has climbed rapidly since the 1960s (Fig. 1).  
Investigations of the causes of this increase have highlighted the impact of changing 
institutional arrangements, such as the introduction of tracking in 1970 (Binder, Lawrence 
and Smith 2002; Koger 2010).1  Tracking, which allows filibustered legislation to occupy a 
separate track than the rest of Senate business, ended the requirement that filibustering 
senators hold the floor.  The end of the physical cost of filibustering, plus decreased social 
costs due to changing senatorial norms, have prompted observers to describe the modern 
filibuster as costless (Oppenheimer 1985, Ornstein 2003, Wawro and Schickler 2006).  The 
question then is not, “Why are there so many filibusters?” but rather, “Why aren’t there 
more?” 
Jones (2000) offers trailblazing work on restraint from filibuster.  Unfortunately, 
despite hypotheses that are formulated in set-theoretic terms, his study employs logistic 
regression.2  Too often in the social sciences, we theorize the world one way but model it 
another (Abbott 1988).  Instead of estimating the net effects of independent variables, I use 
Boolean logic to explore how the causes of restraint are patterned.  In this method, different 
causal pathways are not treated as though they are in competition with each other.  
Furthermore, certain causes may need to occur simultaneously to produce a result, which is 
not captured by regression.  In order to expose these causal patterns, I employ fuzzy-set 
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), developed by Ragin (2000, 2008). 
 
                                                 
1
 Confusion over when tracking began abounds (Wawro and Schickler 2006:261). I follow Binder, Lawrence, 
and Smith (2002:419), who confirmed the date with the then–assistant parliamentarian. 
 
2
 For example, “While high party polarization is always expected to foster filibustering, low party polarization 
is not always expected to produce restraint” (Jones 2000:58). 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Members of Congress have three basic goals: to craft public policy, secure re-
election, and obtain influence within their chamber (Fenno 1973). To say that senators’ 
actions are strategic is not to subscribe to a rational actor model.  Senators’ decisions are 
embedded in sequences fraught with contingency.  As Wawro and Schickler (2006:35) point 
out, if senators had access to perfect information, then filibusters would not occur. 
Before discussing why senators might refrain from filibustering, it is important to 
understand why they filibuster in the first place.3  When legislation runs counter to the policy 
preferences of senators, yet cannot be defeated in an up-or-down vote, the legislation’s 
opponents can delay a final vote by filibustering.  This may prompt changes to the legislation 
so that it meets with the filibustering senators’ approval, or kill the bill entirely by preventing 
a final vote from occurring. 
Filibustering is more than just a tool for crafting policy: it may also help senators 
achieve their goal of re-election.  Throughout the twentieth century, the Senate became more 
visible to the public, and senators became more dependent on the attention of the electorate.  
Filibustering is one way for senators to distinguish themselves in the media, and the 
introduction of legislative television (e.g., C-SPAN) increased senators’ likelihood of 
filibustering (Mixon 2002; Mixon, Gibson and Upadhyaya 2003).  In addition to “making a 
name” for the senator with their constituents, filibusters are also used to attract the attention 
of donors and interest groups (Sinclair 1989; Mixon, Crocker and Black 2005).  Finally, 
filibustering may help to protect against primary challenges by providing senators with the 
                                                 
3
 For an overview of senators’ filibustering behavior, see Table 1. 
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opportunity to position themselves as outsiders, thereby creating symbolic distance between 
them and “Washington.” 
While acknowledging the “political and electoral demands on senators,” Binder and 
Smith (1997:13) attribute the increase in filibustering since the 1960s to “changes in 
workload, partisanship, [and] procedural strategies.”  As the Senate’s workload has 
increased, legislation-supporting majorities have been increasingly unable to wait out 
filibusters.  In the two multivariate analyses of the increase in filibusters, time pressures are 
significantly positively correlated with filibusters per Congressional session (Binder, 
Lawrence and Smith 2002; Koger 2010).  Senate leaders have responded to increasing 
legislative demands by dropping wars of attrition in favor of tracking.  Binder and Smith 
(1997:15) partly blame tracking for the increase in filibusters because it makes them “more 
tolerable and less costly to the filibustering senators.”  Conversely, Koger (2010:137), like 
Wawro and Schickler (2006), sees tracking as “a minor reform that is symptomatic of a 
broader shift from attrition to cloture as the dominant response to obstruction but that has 
little independent effect.” 
Binder and Smith (1997) also propose increased party cohesion as an explanation for 
the rise in filibusters.  Binder, Lawrence and Smith (2002) find that party strength, measured 
as an interaction between size and cohesion, is significantly positively correlated with 
filibusters per session.  One explanation for the recent increase in party cohesion holds that 
party members are more likely to vote together when parties are polarized, and Koger (2010) 
does find the gap between the parties’ average DW-NOMINATE scores to be significant.4  
                                                 
4
 The NOMINATE score places Congress members within a two-dimensional ideological space based on their 
voting behavior. The horizontal axis runs from liberal to conservative, while the vertical axis is a specific, often 
cross-cutting issue. This technique has been developed into DW-NOMINATE, which allows for comparisons 
across different Congresses. 
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Yet Lee (2009:2) finds that the parties’ ideological differences do not “account for the extent 
of party conflict in Congress.”  Rather, Lee argues that the members of a party share in its 
fortunes and are locked into a zero-sum reputational game with the opposing party.  I contend 
that this reputational game is where the dynamics of symbolic inflation drive the increase in 
filibusters, and that party polarization does not independently affect the incidence of the 
filibuster. 
With the lowered costs and heightened reasons to filibuster, why would senators who 
oppose a bill and have the numbers to block cloture refrain from filibustering?  Jones 
(2000:56) suggests that “restraint should be more likely when the opportunity costs of 
filibustering are higher, when the rewards for restraint are more likely, and when retaliation 
for non-restraint is more likely.”  Even a so-called costless filibuster has its opportunity cost.  
When it comes to pursuing policy goals, in addition to modifying or blocking legislation that 
they disagree with, senators also have policies that they would like to make law.  Time spent 
negotiating a filibuster, even one that occurs in the background of normal Senate business, is 
time not spent on other goals. 
One way that senators pursue their policy goals is by obtaining favors.  In his mid-
century study of the Senate, Matthews (1960:99-101) describes senators as expecting—and 
receiving—reciprocity for helping their colleagues achieve policy goals.  However, this norm 
of cooperation has been eroding, and Senate leaders are limited in their ability to punish 
transgressors (Sinclair 1989:89-101).  Senate leaders are not the only ones to offer or 
withhold rewards: Jones (2000) finds that presidential support for legislation is associated 
with restraint from filibustering.  This is at odds with Lee (2009:74-102), who finds that a 
president’s assuming leadership on an issue intensifies resistance from the opposing party. 
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Overby and Bell’s (2004:920) analysis of filibustering by retiring senators, who should no 
longer have to worry about rewards or retaliation from any quarter, is “ambiguous.”  Koger 
(2010) includes Senate turnover as a proxy for the continuity of norms, but this variable is 
not significant. 
Retaliation for past obstruction may play a role in senators’ decision to filibuster.  A 
“parliamentary arms race” seems to be underway in the Senate: 
“Republicans, for example, defended their use of the filibuster to block much of 
President Bill Clinton’s congressional agenda in 1994 on the grounds that the 
Democrats had done the same thing to George Bush and the Republicans in 1992.  
And Democrats filibustered regulatory reform, congressional term limits, and other 
aspects of the Republican agenda in 1995 and 1996, knowing that Republicans had 
used the filibuster effectively against the Democrats in 1994.  As one Senate observer 
noted, ‘Once parliamentary strategies such as these have been unleashed, they—like 
the atom bomb—cannot be uninvented’” (Binder and Smith 1997:17). 
This is supported by Binder, Lawrence and Smith’s (2002) analysis, which finds the lagged 
number of filibusters from the previous session to be predictive of the number of filibusters 
in a Congressional session.  I contend that this is a case of symbolic inflation: senators have 
become more willing to filibuster as routine opposition requires increasingly extreme 
measures.  Since past filibusters predict future ones, the question arises of how this arms race 
was set off; I argue that the minority party’s repertoire produced diminishing returns until it 
evolved (Swidler 1986, Lamont 1992). 
There is another form of retaliation that may stay senators’ filibusters: filibuster 
reform.  Koger (2010) was unable to find support for his hypothesis that threats of reform 
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affect the incidence of filibustering, but this may change since Senate Majority Leader Harry 
Reid (D-NV) displayed not only the willingness but the capability to reform the filibuster, 
albeit in limited fashion.  Of course, such reform may merely set off another parliamentary 
arms race, leading to the filibuster’s complete dismantling upon the Republicans’ winning 
control of the Senate. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
I expect senators to refrain from filibustering when: 
1. Much time remains in the Congressional calendar or the Senate’s workload is light. 
When senators are under pressure to pass legislation, whether due to the close of the 
Congressional calendar or a heavy workload, filibusters are more likely to occur because they 
tend be met with quick concessions (Oppenheimer 1985).  When the reverse is true, I expect 
senators who are considering a filibuster to bide their time instead. 
2. The preceding Congress witnessed comparatively few filibusters. 
I believe that this factor boosts senators’ collegiality and thereby increases their willingness 
to exercise restraint.  Although the precise level of symbolic inflation cannot be measured, 
this factor also provides a clue to the symbolic inflation “rate.” 
3. The president is a member of the Senate’s minority party. 
When the president is a member of the Senate’s majority party, a victory for the majority is a 
victory for the president (Lee 2009); therefore, I expect the minority to filibuster in such 
instances.  When the reverse is true, I expect it to exercise restraint. 
4. Democrats are the Senate’s minority party. 
Restraint has historically been higher when Democrats are in the minority (Fig. 2).  In the 
8 
 
94th through 109th Congress, the average Democratic minority exercised restraint 27% of the 
time, while the average Republican minority exercised restraint 9% of the time.  Therefore, I 
expect restraint to occur more often when Democrats are in the minority. 
5. Legislation is considered to be non-major. 
Whether they are being collegial or fearing reprisal, senators should be more willing to 
exercise restraint when the legislation under consideration is comparatively unimportant.  
Also, even filibusters that do not involve holding the floor still have their opportunity costs; 
therefore, senators should be more willing to let the “little things” go. 
Separate from the above and consistent with the discussion on page 4, 
6. I do not expect party polarization to affect senators’ propensity to restrain from 
filibustering. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
To solve the puzzle of why senators who could filibuster refrain from doing so, I 
compiled a population of cases by searching Senate roll call votes from the 94th through 109th 
Congress for Nay votes equal to or less than 50 (so that a bill’s opponents could not simply 
vote it down) yet greater than 40 (so that the majority party could not simply impose cloture 
and thereby overcome a filibuster).5  Since the beginning of the 94th Congress in 1975, sixty 
votes have been needed to pass a cloture motion.6  Prior to that, two-thirds of present and 
                                                 
5
 Information about legislation is retrieved from Congress.gov, which is operated by the Library of Congress. 
6
 The sixty-vote threshold for imposing cloture is derived from “three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and 
sworn,” and thus is affected by vacancies (Beth, Heitshusen, Palmer 2010:9). The vote interval under 
consideration was adjusted during these instances. 
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voting senators were required, which caused the threshold to shift depending on the number 
of senators in attendance on a given day. 
Bills with 41 to 50 Nays were then checked to ensure that they could be filibustered: 
budget-related bills are subject to reconciliation rules that allow only twenty hours of debate 
(Heniff and Murray 2012).  At this stage, I added filibustered bills that never received a roll-
call vote to the population of cases, yielding a total of 175.  From this population, I then 
determined the cases where restraint from filibuster is present.  “Filibuster” is not a technical 
term and thus establishing one’s presence poses methodological difficulties (Beth 1995).  
Because the existence of a filibuster is ultimately determined by a senator’s intent, there are 
no clear-cut criteria.  Using cloture votes as proxies is unwise because “cloture may be 
sought when no filibuster is taking place, and filibusters may occur without cloture being 
sought” (Beth and Palmer 2011:2).  Building on the work of Burdette (1940) and Beth 
(1994), Bell and Overby (2007) have created the most exhaustive and transparent 
identification of filibusters, and I used their list.  Of the 455 filibusters identified since 1826, 
282 occurred between the opening of the 94th Congress in 1975 and close of the 109th 
Congress in 2006; that is to say, 62% of the filibusters occurred in just 18% of the time under 
consideration. 
Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is founded on set logic; once cases’ 
membership in the outcome (i.e., restraint) set was established, I then constructed sets of 
causal conditions.  As discussed above, the factors that may contribute to the decision to 
filibuster include time constraints, previous filibustering, partisanship, party differences, and 
the importance of legislation. 
 
10 
 
Time Constraints 
• Days remaining in Congress 
• Measures introduced during Congress 
To measure time constraints, I included the days remaining in the Congress when the 
legislation was introduced, calibrated in the program fs/QCA to determine cases’ degree of 
membership in the short-time set (Ragin, Drass and Davey 2006).  The calibration thresholds 
did not have qualitative bases, but rather were selected based on deviations from the mean.  
Senators’ workload also increases pressure on their time.  I followed Jones’ (2000:62) 
workload measure by recording the “total number of bills and resolutions introduced during 
the Congress in which each item is considered.”  That number was then calibrated to 
determine membership in the high-workload set, and the union of these two sets form the 
constrained-time set. 
 
Previous Filibusters 
• Number of filibusters during the preceding Congress 
Senators’ decisions take into account their colleagues’ past choices, so I used the number of 
filibusters during the preceding Congress to calibrate cases’ degree of membership in the 
low-previous-filibuster set. 
 
Partisanship and Party Differences 
• Presidential membership in the Senate’s majority party 
• Democrats are the Senate’s minority party 
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• Difference in party means on the first DW-NOMINATE dimension7 
Both whether the president shares membership in the Senate’s majority party and whether 
Democrats form the Senate’s minority party were straightforwardly established in crisp sets.  
The difference between the party means on the first DW-NOMINATE dimension was 
calibrated to form the high-polarization set. 
 
Importance of Legislation 
• Listed as “Major Legislation” 
Taking inspiration from Jones (2000), I included a case in the major-legislation set if the bill 
is listed in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report as “Major Legislation” or is featured in 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac’s year-end summary.  Unfortunately, these periodicals are 
incompletely digitized, so this set only includes the 94th through 102nd Congress. 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Once the sets were established, I analyzed them using Fuzzy, a program that allows 
QCA to be performed in Stata (Longest and Vaisey 2008).  Fuzzy features probabilistic 
testing of causes’ necessity and sufficiency, which defuses a common criticism of QCA.  
Solutions are tested along two dimensions: consistency and coverage.  Consistency may be 
likened to significance and coverage to strength (Ragin 2008:45).  Consistency evaluates the 
extent to which “cases sharing a given condition or combination of conditions” (e.g., low 
filibustering during the previous Congress) “agree in displaying the outcome in question” 
                                                 
7
 DW-NOMINATE data was retrieved from the website maintained by the measure’s developer, Dr. Keith 
Poole: http://voteview.com/Political_Polarization.asp. The first dimension of DW-NOMINATE is commonly 
interpreted as the liberal-conservative spectrum. 
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(i.e., restraint from filibuster), while coverage concerns how many cases feature a cause or 
causal combination (Ragin 2006:292). 
For the complete population of cases, there are five causal conditions: constrained 
time, low filibustering during the previous Congress, the president’s membership in the 
Senate’s majority party, a Democratic minority in the Senate, and high party polarization.  
My hypotheses are that membership in the restraint set is consistent with membership in the 
low-previous-filibuster and Democratic-minority sets, while also being consistent with the 
absence of membership in the constrained-time and majority-president sets; meanwhile, party 
polarization should not be part of the causal pathway. 
Two combinations are significantly consistent with restraint (Log 1).  Using Boolean 
algebra, these combinations reduce to ~constrained time • low previous filibuster • president 
majority • ~Democratic minority (Table 2).8  The pathway’s consistency is 0.789, safely 
above the 0.75 cut-off for meaningful consistency identified by Ragin (2008:46).  Its 
coverage is low; however, there can be a “trade-off” between consistency and coverage due 
to the complexity of the pathway and the high number of set relations involved (Ragin 
2008:117).  In this pathway to restraint, time is not constrained, there was low filibustering 
during the previous Congress, the president shares membership in the Senate’s majority 
party, and Democrats are not in the minority.  Note that party polarization is not part of the 
pathway.  This result validates hypotheses 1, 2, and 6, but not hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Hypothesis 3 was designed to adjudicate between Jones (2000) and Lee (2009) 
regarding the impact of presidential policy preferences on senators’ decision to filibuster.  
These results support Jones’ (2000) finding that presidents’ backing legislation encourages 
                                                 
8
 The symbol “~” indicates negation, while the symbol “•” indicates multiplication. 
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senators to refrain from filibustering; however, Lee (2009) is partially vindicated because 
party polarization, i.e., divergent ideologies, does not make a difference to the outcome.  
Likewise, although hypothesis 4 regarding Democratic minorities was incorrect, this result 
still points toward party differences. 
 Although included in the previous analysis, cases from the 94th through 102nd 
Congress were analyzed again with six causal conditions, this time including legislation’s 
importance.  This configuration has two solutions: ~constrained time • low previous 
filibuster • president majority • ~Democratic minority and low previous filibuster • president 
majority • ~Democratic minority • high party polarization • ~major legislation (Table 3).  
The first pathway is the same as for the full population.  Interestingly, the second pathway 
suggests a relationship between hypotheses 5 and 6: for party polarization to matter, 
legislation must be unimportant, and even then, it is high polarization that is conducive to 
restraint.  This relationship would have been overlooked in a net-effects analysis.  It should 
be noted, however, that this causal combination did not occur in the population, and is a 
counterfactual pathway.  Counterfactuals were introduced to sociology by Weber (1949) and 
form an important part of fsQCA (Ragin 2008:147-175). 
All pathways feature membership in both the low-filibuster and the restraint sets, 
confirming hypothesis 2, which predicts that senators will refrain from filibustering when the 
preceding Congress witnessed comparatively few filibusters.  This, especially in conjunction 
with the confirmation of hypothesis 6 regarding the unimportance of party polarization, 
indicates that symbolic inflation is a major driver of the increasing use of the filibuster.  
Since the end of the 109th Congress, filibustering has only escalated (Fig. 3).  Without 
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countervailing influences, there will be only more filibusters in the years to come, as 
formerly extreme responses solidify into routine opposition. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Studies of the filibuster, and legislative gridlock more generally, tend to treat the two 
parties as interchangeable, but they are subject to different political and electoral demands.  
Although hypothesis 4, that Democrats qua Democrats promote restraint, did not prove 
correct, even this refutation indicates party differences; further research should be carried out 
on the distinct cultures of the two parties.  In addition, the president’s role in gridlock 
remains an open question.  Although hypothesis 3, that the president’s alignment with the 
Senate’s minority party promotes restraint, did not prove correct, I am not convinced that Lee 
(2009) is wrong about presidential leadership intensifying opposition.  It’s possible that 
opposing parties used to be more deferential to the president than they are today.  Further 
research should be carried out on the role of the president in legislative gridlock; for 
example, with more time and funding, this research could be updated through the 113th 
Congress. 
 Perhaps the most interesting result is the confirmation of hypothesis 6, that party 
polarization does not affect senators’ propensity to refrain from filibustering.  This finding 
differs from that of Jones (2000), whose dichotomous measure of polarization is significant.  
While the recent trend in party polarization remains intriguing evidence of symbolic 
inflation, I join with Lee (2009) in arguing that it is time to reevaluate the importance of 
pivotal politics in legislative gridlock (Krehbiel 1998).  Hopefully, further research will 
replicate and publicize my findings. 
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With senators serving longer terms than their counterparts in the House and originally 
being elected by state legislatures rather than by popular vote, the senate was designed to be 
the more conservative chamber.  While not devised by Constitutional framers, the filibuster 
has been a hallmark of the Senate since 1826.  As the Senate enters the 21st century, however, 
some senators are questioning whether the filibuster should remain a feature of the chamber.  
The filibuster is an inherently conservative device, as it impedes the passage of new 
legislation and thereby preserves the status quo.  But this brake now threatens to halt the 
Senate entirely. 
An arms race, even a parliamentary one, leads to the certainty of mutually assured 
destruction, but senators would not be the only ones destroyed in the event of complete 
legislative breakdown.  Symbolic inflation and the other causes that underlie the escalating 
rate of filibustering can still be checked.  Perhaps it is time for partial reform, such as 
requiring filibustering senators to hold the floor or lowering the cloture threshold.  By 
uncovering the factors that prompt senators to refrain from filibustering, this study, along 
with future research, holds out the hope of reducing filibustering while nonetheless 
preserving it as an option.  This prevents unforeseen consequences of total filibuster reform, 
while still promoting legislative effectiveness. 
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Fig. 1: Filibusters per Year, 1956-2006
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Fig. 2: Restraint from Filibuster, 94th–109th Congress
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Fig. 3: Cloture Motions Filed, 94th–113th Congress
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APPENDIX 2: TABLES 
Table 1: Filibustering Behavior, 94th–109th Congress 
 
Congress Senators Filibustering Median Filibusters per 
Filibustering Senator 
Mean Filibusters per 
Filibustering Senator 
94 22 1 1.41 
95 8 1.5 1.50 
96 11 1 1.36 
97 12 1 1.50 
98 19 1 1.26 
99 26 1 1.54 
100 24 1 1.50 
101 18 1 1.39 
102 34 1 1.47 
103 23 1 1.39 
104 22 1 1.73 
105 17 1 1.47 
106 14 1 1.21 
107 14 1 1.71 
108 14 1 1.57 
109 16 1 1.25 
AVG 18.375 1.03 1.45 
 
Table 2: Final Reduction Set, 94th–109th Congress 
 
Set 
 
Raw Coverage 
 
Unique Coverage 
Solution 
Consistency 
c•L•P•d 0.004 0.004 0.789 
Total Coverage = 0.004 
Solution Consistency = 0.789 
Note: “C” represents a measure of constrained time, “L” is a measure of low filibustering during the previous 
Congress, “P” is a measure of the president’s membership in the Senate’s majority party, and “D” is a measure 
of Democrats being the Senate’s minority party.  A lower case letter indicates the negation of that set.  See text 
for operationalization and Log 1 for how this table was generated. 
 
Table 3: Final Reduction Set, 94th–102nd Congress 
 
Set 
 
Raw Coverage 
 
Unique Coverage 
Solution 
Consistency 
L•P•d•Z•m 0.000 0.000 1.000 
c•L•P•d 0.010 0.009 0.789 
Total Coverage = 0.010 
Solution Consistency = 0.789  
Note: “Z” represents a measure of party polarization, and “M” is a measure of major legislation; see note to 
Table 2 for other letter meanings.  A lower case letter indicates the negation of that set.  See text for 
operationalization and Log 2 for how this table was generated.  
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APPENDIX 3: STATA LOGS 
Log 1: Testing and Reducing with Fuzzy, 94th–109th Congress 
 
. insheet using Dataset_Full.csv 
(24 vars, 175 obs) 
 
. fuzzy restraint constrtimef lowfilif highpolarf prezmajor demminor, 
label(R C L Z P D) 
 
. fuzzy R C L Z P D, matx(coincid suffnec) standardized 
 
Coincidence Matrix 
 
             |         R          C          L          Z          P          D  
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           R |     1.000                                                         
           C |     0.723      1.000                                              
           L |     0.614      0.836      1.000                                   
           Z |     0.622      0.710      0.571      1.000                        
           P |     0.522      0.698      0.733      0.496      1.000             
           D |     0.746      0.699      0.761      0.840      0.790      1.000  
 
Sufficiency and Necessity Matrix 
 
             |         R          C          L          Z          P          D  
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           R |     1.000      0.723      0.614      0.622      0.522      0.746  
           C |     0.381      1.000      0.594      0.511      0.445      0.621  
           L |     0.455      0.836      1.000      0.571      0.657      0.761  
           Z |     0.455      0.710      0.563      1.000      0.439      0.840  
           P |     0.432      0.698      0.733      0.496      1.000      0.790  
           D |     0.442      0.699      0.608      0.681      0.566      1.000  
 
. fuzzy R C L Z P D, settest(yvv yvn) conval(.75) greater(col1) common 
 
Y-CONSISTENCY vs N-CONSISTENCY 
Set        YCons     NCons       F         P     NumBestFit 
cLzPd      0.789     0.211      3.02     0.084         0 
cLZPd      1.000     0.000         .         .         0 
cLZPD      0.555     0.445      0.27     0.604        19 
CLZpD      0.557     0.443      0.32     0.571        13 
CLZPd      0.667     0.333      0.37     0.542         0 
CLZPD      0.544     0.456      0.28     0.600        17 
 
Y-Consistency vs. Set Value 
Set      YConsist  Set Value    F         P         NumBestFit 
cLzPd      0.789     0.740      0.09     0.767         0 
cLZPd      1.000     0.740         .         .         0 
 
Common Sets 
cLzPd cLZPd 
 
. reduce 
 
2 Solutions Entered as True 
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Minimum Configuration Reduction Set 
cLPd 
 
Final Reduction Set 
 
Coverage 
Set         Raw Coverage     Unique Coverage     Solution Consistency 
c*L*P*d             0.004             0.004                 0.789 
 
Total Coverage = 0.004     
Solution Consistency = 0.789     
 
Log 2: Testing and Reducing with Fuzzy, 94th–102nd Congress 
 
. insheet using Dataset_Full.csv 
(24 vars, 175 obs) 
 
. drop if cqmajor==. 
(72 observations deleted) 
 
. fuzzy restraint constrtimef lowfilif highpolarf prezmajor demminor 
cqmajor, label(R C L Z P D M) 
 
. fuzzy R C L Z P D M, matx(coincid suffnec) standardized 
 
Coincidence Matrix 
 
             |         R          C          L          Z          P          D          M 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           R |     1.000                                                         
           C |     0.849      1.000                                              
           L |     0.497      0.922      1.000                                   
           Z |     0.328      0.748      0.287      1.000                        
           P |     0.484      0.716      0.673      0.250      1.000             
           D |     0.548      0.770      0.652      0.622      0.622      1.000  
           M |     0.258      0.833      0.595      0.132      0.455      0.424      1.000  
 
Sufficiency and Necessity Matrix 
 
             |         R          C          L          Z          P          D          M  
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           R |     1.000      0.849      0.497      0.252      0.484      0.548      0.258   
           C |     0.332      1.000      0.523      0.225      0.406      0.456      0.346 
           L |     0.343      0.922      1.000      0.152      0.673      0.652      0.436 
           Z |     0.328      0.748      0.287      1.000      0.250      0.622      0.132   
           P |     0.333      0.716      0.673      0.132      1.000      0.622      0.333 
           D |     0.362      0.770      0.625      0.316      0.596      1.000      0.298  
           M |     0.242      0.833      0.595      0.095      0.455      0.424      1.000 
 
. fuzzy R C L Z P D M, settest(yvv yvn) conval(.75) greater(col1) common 
 
Note: clZPdM ClZPdM Have No Information and Excluded from Test 
 
Y-CONSISTENCY vs N-CONSISTENCY 
Set        YCons     NCons       F         P     NumBestFit 
cLzPdm     0.789     0.211      1.50     0.223         0 
cLzPdM     0.789     0.211      1.50     0.223         0 
cLZPdm     1.000     0.000         .         .         0 
cLZPdM     1.000     0.000         .         .         0 
CLzPdm     0.525     0.475      0.00     0.945         2 
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CLZPdm     1.000     0.000         .         .         0 
 
Note: clZPdM ClZPdM Have No Information and Excluded from Test 
 
Y-Consistency vs. Set Value 
Set      YConsist  Set Value    F         P         NumBestFit 
cLzPdm     0.789     0.740      0.04     0.835         0 
cLzPdM     0.789     0.740      0.04     0.835         0 
cLZPdm     1.000     0.740         .         .         0 
cLZPdM     1.000     0.740         .         .         0 
CLZPdm     1.000     0.740         .         .         0 
 
Common Sets 
cLzPdm cLzPdM cLZPdm cLZPdM CLZPdm 
 
. reduce 
 
5 Solutions Entered as True 
 
Minimum Configuration Reduction Set 
LZPdm cLPd 
 
Final Reduction Set 
 
Coverage 
Set          Raw Coverage     Unique Coverage     Solution Consistency 
L*Z*P*d*m       0.000             0.000                 1.000 
c*L*P*d         0.010             0.009                 0.789 
 
Total Coverage = 0.010     
Solution Consistency = 0.789  
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